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The Oxford Companion to International Criminal
Justice. Edited by Antonio Cassese. Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp.
xxxiii, 1008. Index. $285, £130, cloth; $99,
£45, paper.
It is impossible, in the space of a short review, to
do justice to a book such as the Oxford Companion
to International Criminal Justice. Twelve hundred
pages long, written by 132 authors, and compris-
ing 21 essays, 300 encyclopedia entries, and more
than 330 case synopses, the book is, quite simply,
the most ambitious edited work in the history of
international criminal law (ICL). Fortunately, it is
also the best.
The book itself is divided into three parts. Part
A, the essay section, addresses “major problems
of international criminal justice.” Part B, the en-
cyclopedic section, deals with “issues, institutions,
and personalities” in ICL. Part C, the jurispruden-
tial section, provides synopses of international
and domestic cases, past and present, that have
addressed individual responsibility for serious
international crimes. Each part is valuable in its
own right; indeed, each could easily have been
published as a stand-alone volume. That all three
parts are available in one book makes the Oxford
Companion an essential addition to the library of
anyone interested in ICL.
That is not to say, however, that the book is
without flaws. On the contrary, two problems
affect all three parts of the Oxford Companion.
The first is conceptual: the book cannot seem to
decide who its audience is—the educated public or
ICL experts. In his introduction, Antonio Cassese,
the book’s principal editor, suggests an egalitarian
answer: “It is designed to be used not only by inter-
national and criminal lawyers (both practitioners
and academics) but also by anybody interested in
the current developments of international justice”
(p. vii). Unfortunately, the book falls well short of
realizing its rather schizophrenic mandate: a sig-
nificant number of essays, entries, and synopses
are either too technical for even the knowledgeable
layperson or too simple for the ICL expert.
The second problem is substantive: the book
reveals a significant pro-prosecution bias. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, the essays, entries,
and synopses pay far too little attention to defense
issues and all too often avoid acknowledging when
a particular case or issue has been subjected to seri-
ous scholarly criticism. In one sense, of course, nei-
ther lacuna is surprising: scholars have long noted
that ICL is generally far more prosecution friendly
than domestic criminal law.1 It does not seem
unfair, however, to expect a book of this ambi-
tion—and of this importance—to avoid present-
ing a sanitized version of ICL that overstates both
its coherence and its fairness.
The authors of the 21 essays in part A read like
a Who’s Who of international criminal law: Jose
Alvarez, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Christine Chinkin,
Mirjan Damasˇka, George Fletcher, Gerhard Werle,
and others. Many of the essays are exceptionally
useful. For example, Dapo Akande’s contribution,
“Sources of International Criminal Law,” man-
ages to present a concise introduction to the
subject that not only is comprehensive, but even
manages to address some of the most difficult
interpretive issues, such as the tension—unique
to ICL—between the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties, which provides that am-
biguous treaty provisions should be interpreted
by reference to the treaty’s travaux pre´paratoires,
and the principle in dubio pro reo, which requires
those ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the
defendant. Claus Kreß’s essay, “The International
Criminal Court As a Turning Point in the History
of International Criminal Justice,” is similarly
impressive, managing to cover, in a few short
pages, everything from the centrality of the nullum
crimen sine lege principle to the unique aspects of
international criminal procedure. Such a wide-
ranging essay could easily have been written too
technically or too generally, but Kreß finds the
perfect degree of specificity, pitching the discus-
sion at a level that is both informative for lay-
persons and enlightening for ICL experts—a feat
that, regrettably, some of the other essays fail to
replicate.
Other essays are also worth singling out for
praise. Damasˇka’s contribution, “Problematic
Features of International Criminal Procedure,”
addresses one of the most important, but all too
1 See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of
International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925,
927 (2008).
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frequently overlooked, questions in international
criminal justice: how to rank the “cornucopia of
goals” (p. 179) that international criminal tribu-
nals have set for themselves, such as deterrence,
retribution, creating a historical record, and satis-
fying victims. As Damasˇka rightly points out, “If
this sense of rank existed, acceptable terms of
trade-offs among competing goals could be iden-
tified, and greater coherence achieved in decision-
making” (p. 175). That essay is nicely comple-
mented by Salvatore Zappala`’s original “Judicial
Activism v. Judicial Restraint in International
Criminal Justice,” which explores the tension that
exists—and has always existed—in ICL between
the need to interpret ICL progressively and the
obligation to ensure that defendants receive fair
trials. Finally, Go¨ran Sluiter’s essay, “Cooperation
of States with International Criminal Tribunals,”
provides a systematic overview of the key issues
in state-tribunal cooperation that is legally sophis-
ticated yet written clearly enough for even a lay-
person to understand.
Praise notwithstanding, there are some notable
problems with part A. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant is that the essays do not seem to be arranged
in any kind of discernible order. Why, for exam-
ple, is Alvarez’s “Alternatives to International
Criminal Justice” in section I, while Cassese’s
“The Rationale for International Criminal Jus-
tice” is in section IV? Doesn’t the reader—partic-
ularly the lay reader—need to know why interna-
tional criminal justice exists before she considers
alternatives to it? Similarly, why is Bassiouni’s
“International Criminal Justice in Historical Per-
spective,” which is a foundational topic, relegated
to Section IV instead of placed in Section I? And
finally, doesn’t logic dictate that Gerhard Werle’s
“General Principles of International Criminal
Law,” which deals primarily with individual crim-
inal responsibility for international crimes, should
come after Paola Gaeta’s “International Criminal-
ization of Prohibited Conduct”?
These are not minor quibbles. The essays in part
A coexist uneasily with the encyclopedia entries in
part B and the case synopses in part C; the reader
never gets the sense that the three parts form a
coherent, organic whole. To some extent, that
simply reflects the very different structure of the
essays, which are longer and more narrative than
the entries and synopses. But the disjunction is
only magnified by the somewhat disorganized
nature of the essays, given that the entries and syn-
opses are arranged much more systematically.
Were the essays in part A ordered more naturally
—as a comprehensive introduction to interna-
tional criminal justice—the book would lose
much of its schizophrenic character.
A few other problems with part A are also worth
mentioning. First, the audience problem men-
tioned above afflicts the essays. A few are far too
abstract and complex to be useful to the lay reader,
such as Akande’s essay and Bert Swart’s skillful
“Modes of International Criminal Liability.”
Others are very useful for the lay reader but not
sophisticated enough to be of much interest to the
ICL expert, such as the essays by Gaeta and Werle.
Again, the book does not seem to know what it
wants to be—a handy research tool for those who
work in ICL or a sophisticated introduction to
international criminal justice for those who don’t.
Second, although the essays are admirably and
appropriately concise, the concision of some es-
says leads either to misleading generalizations
about ICL or assertions that are too conclusory to
be useful. In the first category is Bassiouni’s state-
ment that both the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) and the Special Panels in East Timor
“have been able to achieve some positive results”
(p. 139). Lumping the SCSL and the Special Pan-
els together obscures the fact that (as Bassiouni
certainly knows) the former has been vastly more
successful in combating impunity and providing
fair trials than the latter.2 In the second category is
Andrea Bianchi’s claim that, between individual
versus state responsibility, “available defences may
differ and may operate differently in the different
context in which they are invoked” (p. 19). Which
defenses—and how do they operate differently?
Third, there are some significant overlaps be-
tween essays. Werle’s and Swart’s contributions,
for example, both discuss superior responsibility
(Werle, p. 59; Swart, p. 88) and inchoate crimes
2 See, e.g., David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned”
and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1,
6–23 (2007).
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(Werle, pp. 59–60; Swart, p. 88). Similarly,
although all three are excellent, Sluiter’s essay,
Bing Bing Jia’s “The International Criminal Court
and Third States,” and Rob Cryer’s “Means of
Gathering Evidence and Arresting Suspects in
Situations of States’ Failure to Cooperate” all dis-
cuss the relationship between the ICC and third
states. To be sure, each essay has a slightly differ-
ent emphasis. Nevertheless, the reader would be
far more likely to understand this important topic
if the editors had coordinated the essays more
carefully.
Fourth, there is at least one significant lacuna in
part A’s coverage of ICL: the international crimes
themselves. Gaeta’s useful essay discusses the
gradual criminalization of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and aggression, but
it does not focus on the current definitions of
those crimes. Nor does any other essay discuss
those definitions in any detail. That seems like a
major oversight, given that part A contains essays
on modes of participation (Swart), general princi-
ples of ICL (Werle), and ICL’s procedural regime
(Kreß, Damasˇka).
Fifth, and finally, the system of cross-references
used in part A—and in the rest of the book—
could be improved. Some cross-references are
ambiguous, such as the reference in Bianchi’s
essay to “national v. international jurisdiction
over international crimes” (p. 21) That is an essay
in part A (which is actually entitled “International
v. National Prosecution of International Crimes”),
not an entry in part B—but there is no way to
tell that from the reference itself. Other refer-
ences are inconsistent. Alvarez’s essay, for exam-
ple, cross-references “universal jurisdiction”
(p. 26) in one place and “universality principle”
(p. 27) in another, while the entry for the “univer-
sality principle” in part B (p. 558) simply redirects
the reader to the entry for “universal jurisdiction”
(p. 555). The reader should not have to scurry
around looking for the appropriate entry.
Part B is a monumental achievement—the first
comprehensive presentation of the basic “issues,
institutions, and personalities” in ICL. I predict
that part B will prove to be the most popular sec-
tion of the Oxford Companion, the first stop for
researchers and practitioners trying to familiarize
themselves with a particular area of ICL.
The vast majority of the 300 entries are first-
rate, and many are simply stellar. Eve Le Haye’s
“Common Article 3” manages to detail—in less
than 2000 words—the article’s drafting history,
basic provisions, judicial interpretation, and major
criticisms. Go¨ran Sluiter’s “Evidence” is thorough
and well organized, and seamlessly weaves to-
gether the rules of evidence applied by the tribu-
nals and the judicial interpretation of those rules.
Vanessa Thalman’s “Rwandan Genocide Cases”
is superb, not only presenting an elegant account
of the specialized chambers’ jurisdiction, sub-
stantive law, and procedure, but also—and un-
usually—acknowledging the numerous proce-
dural problems with the trials. And Alex Zahar’s
“Superior Orders” presents a concise and sophis-
ticated account of the development of the defense
of superior orders, identifies the different versions
of the defense currently applied by international
tribunals, and discusses the important connection
that exists between the defense and the related
defenses of duress and mistake.
Like part A, however, part B is far from per-
fect. The primary problem, as mentioned above, is
that a number of entries demonstrate a significant
pro-prosecution bias. First, entries dedicated to
defense issues are uniformly short and rudimen-
tary, especially in comparison to prosecution-
oriented entries. “Accused (Rights of ),” for exam-
ple, dedicates less than 1000 words to rights that
have all too often been honored in the breach by
international tribunals. It also spends more than
a few of those words discussing the rights of
victims and witnesses, despite the fact that part B
contains a nearly 2000-word entry on “Victims’
Participation in International Proceedings” and
an approximately 1300-word entry on “Witness
Protection.” Similarly, “Counsel (Right to),” which
is a constant issue at the tribunals, checks in at
little more than 500 words—even shorter, re-
vealingly, than “Code of Conduct for Defence
Counsel”!
Second, a number of the entries concerning
basic concepts in ICL downplay or completely
ignore problems identified by courts and scholars.
The best example in this regard is the entry for
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“Joint Criminal Enterprise,” one of the most con-
troversial theories of liability in ICL. Despite
being one of the longest entries in part B (nearly
4500 words), only 500 words are dedicated to
criticisms of the concept. Some major criticisms
are ignored entirely, such as whether the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via was justified in holding that JCE was implicit
in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute3 and whether
there is a customary basis for all of the forms of
JCE, particularly JCE III.4 Other criticisms are
addressed but casually dismissed, such as the idea
that JCE represents “guilty by association” and
that JCE III’s mens rea requirement is too low.
The author’s response to the latter criticism is par-
ticularly inadequate: instead of addressing why a
defendant should be convicted as a principal per-
petrator of an offense whose actus reus he did not
commit and for which he lacked the necessary
mens rea, the author simply asserts that critics of
JCE III “mischaracterize” (p. 396) the mens rea of
JCE III as recklessness instead of dolus eventualis.
How that justifies JCE III is never explained—and
is in any case a debatable proposition.5
Many other entries have flaws unrelated to a
pro-prosecution bias. Some simply seem unneces-
sary, at least in their present form. The entries on
“Cross-examination” and “Direct Examination,”
for example, limit their discussion of ICL to citing
the relevant rules of procedure and evidence. They
are also very basic, providing information that any
relatively sophisticated layperson will already know.
Other entries make important doctrinal mis-
takes. The entry for “Murder” and the otherwise
excellent entry for “Recklessness,” for example,
both claim that recklessness satisfies the Rome
Statute’s definition of murder. That is incorrect:
Article 30(2)(b) requires knowledge of a conse-
quence, not recklessness—as the entry on “Mens
Rea” recognizes. Similarly, because the entry on
“Kranzbu¨hler, Otto,” who defended Admiral
Do¨nitz at the Nuremburg trial, is so short, it mis-
takenly claims that the lawyer “managed to intro-
duce the ‘tu quoque principle’ as a defence in favor
of Do¨nitz.” As scholars have recognized, Kranz-
bu¨hler successfully challenged the existence of
a customary rule prohibiting unrestricted subma-
rine warfare; he did not argue tu quoque.6
Regrettably, the most deeply flawed entry in
part B is also one of the most important: “Intent.”
The entry makes numerous mistakes concerning
the common-law approach to intent—the result,
no doubt, of the fact that the author does not
come from a common-law system. He claims, for
example, that “if a reasonable man, acting in the
same conditions and possessing the same kind of
knowledge, would have imagined those conse-
quences, recklessness may be inferred” (p. 376).
Not only does the common law categorically dis-
tinguish between intention and recklessness7
(unlike many civilian systems, which include dolus
eventualis as a form of intent),8 the common law
nearly always defines recklessness as requiring
conscious awareness;9 although English criminal
law once provided for “inadvertent recklessness”
such as the author describes, it has since almost
completely returned to the subjective approach.10
Similarly, and contrary to the author’s assertion,
there is no volitional element in the common law’s
approach to either oblique intent or knowledge.11
It is also uncontroversial in the common law that
a mistake of fact does not have to be reasonable to
negative the mens rea of knowledge.12
3 See, e.g., ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GO¨RAN SLUITER,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 226–27 (2008).
4 See, e.g., Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise:
Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial
Creativity? 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606, 615 (2004).
JCE III refers to the “extended” form of joint criminal
enterprise, which holds a defendant criminally respon-
sible for unplanned crimes committed by a member of
the JCE that the defendant foresaw might be com-
mitted.
5 See, e.g., GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 115 (2005) (de-
scribing the mens rea of JCE III as recklessness).
6 See, e.g., Sienho Yee, The Tu Quoque Argument As a
Defence to International Crimes, Prosecution, or Punish-
ment, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 87, 106 (2004).
7 See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 442 (2000).
8 Id. at 445.
9 Id. at 443.
10 See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 183 (2d ed. 1995).
11 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7, at 447.
12 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 167 (4th ed. 2006).
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A number of entries are accurate but contain
significant omissions. “Crimes Against Human-
ity,” for example, provides an excellent discussion
of the jurisprudence of the International Military
Tribunal and the ad hoc tribunals, but it ignores
the many contributions the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals made to the development of the crime
—particularly concerning the nexus require-
ment13—and does not address the implications
of the Rome Statute’s requirement of a “State or
organizational policy.” Similarly, “Command
Responsibility” rightly points out that the ICTY
considers command responsibility to be a dere-
liction-of-duty offense, but fails to acknowledge
that the Rome Statute considers command
responsibility to be a mode of participation in the
underlying crimes.14 Indeed, the entry basically
ignores the Rome Statute: it does not discuss Arti-
cle 28’s different mens rea requirements for mili-
tary and civilian superiors, nor does it mention
the article’s causation requirement,15 despite not-
ing that no such requirement exists at the ICTY.
Other entries are fine individually but could be
profitably combined into larger entries. There is
no reason, for example, to separate “De Facto
Command” from the general entry on “Com-
mand Responsibility.” And is it really necessary
to have different entries for “Armed Conflict,”
“International Armed Conflict,” and “Internal
Armed Conflict”? It would also have been better to
name the latter “Non-international Armed Con-
flict,” given that the International Court of Jus-
tice, the ICTY, and the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hamdan have all held that noninternational
armed conflict is a residual category that encom-
passes any armed conflict that is not of an interna-
tional character.16
Other entries, by contrast, could be profitably
separated. It makes no sense to address attempt,
incitement, and solicitation in a general entry on
inchoate crimes, for example, when the inchoate
crimes of “Conspiracy” and “Instigation” are
given separate entries. Similarly, concepts such as
“Human Trafficking” and “Hostage Taking” are
too complex, and too important, to be folded
into a general entry on “Treaty-Based Crimes.”
As with the essays in part A, some of the entries
in part B are also needlessly duplicative. “Accused
(Rights of )” covers the same ground as “Defen-
dant (Rights of ).” “Sentencing” is not substan-
tially different than “Penalties.” And the ICTY’s
decision in Galic´ figures in both “Terror, as found
in Galic´ ” and “Terrorism.”
Finally, it is worth noting that part B also has
a number of formatting problems. Some entry
names are misleading, such as “Excuses and Justi-
fications.” Why an entry of that name, given that
ICL has never systematically distinguished be-
tween the two17 and that the Rome Statute
(Article 31) refers, instead, to “grounds for exclud-
ing criminal responsibility”? Others entry names
are inconsistent, particularly those that concern
the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda—for example, “ICTY and ICTR (Ap-
pellate Proceedings)”; “Pre-trial Judge (ICTY,
ICTR)”; and “Detention (Ad Hoc International
Tribunals).” And a few cross-references are con-
fusing: “De Jure Command” sends the reader to
“Superior Responsibility,” but that entry simply
directs the reader to “Command Responsibility”;
“Motive” sends the reader to “Mens Rea,” but
there is no discussion of motive in that entry.
Part C is without question the most innovative
part of the Oxford Companion. The 330 synopses
cover a dazzling range of cases. Some are classics
of the field—for example, Dithmar and Boldt
(LLandovery Castle case); Krupp; Eichmann; Tadic´
and Akayesu (together); and Rasul v. Bush. Others,
by contrast, will be unknown even to most ICL
scholars—for example, Bahaˆeddıˆn S¸aˆkir Bey, an
Ottoman Empire case involving the forcible
deportation of Armenians; Harlan ( Jud Su¨ss case),
in which a domestic German Court considered
13 See, e.g., Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War
Crimes and International Law, 450 INT’L CONCILIA-
TION 243, 342–44 (1949).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 329 (2007).
15 See id. at 328.
16 See, e.g., John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in
Non-international Armed Conflict, and Their Protection
in the Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 14, 2006,
at http://www.asil.org/insights060714.cfm.
17 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 258 (2d ed. 2008).
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whether an anti-Jewish propaganda film directed
by one of Germany’s most famous directors was
a crime against humanity; and Nulyarimma v.
Thompson, a recent Australian case in which arrest
warrants were sought for government officials
allegedly responsible for genocide of aboriginals.18
Nor is part C limited to criminal cases: the synop-
ses include important decisions by, among others,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
UN Human Rights Committee, and U.S. courts
applying the Alien Torts Claim Act, such as Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.
There is, in short, something for everyone in
part C. Unfortunately, that is also one of the part’s
weaknesses. In general, the synopses seem aimed
squarely at ICL experts—it is difficult to imagine
laypersons finding concise synopses of obscure
World War I and World War II cases especially
interesting. Indeed, what makes those synopses so
useful for the ICL expert is their legal focus: a
scholar interested in perfidy, for exam-
ple, will be intrigued to learn that the Nigerian
Supreme court decided in Nwaoga to “extend
the rule of customary international law prohibit-
ing perfidy in international armed conflict to
non-international armed conflicts” (p. 856). The
average layperson, however, will find the legally
dense synopsis of Nwaoga to be nearly incompre-
hensible.
The synopses of seminal cases, by contrast, suf-
fer the opposite problem. They are, almost with-
out exception, very skillfully written—no small
task, given that some of the decisions are hundreds
of pages long. But they are relatively general and
are typically limited to noting the facts of the case,
summarizing the decisions of the trial and appeals
chambers, and then very briefly flagging the case’s
“major legal issues” (see, for example, pp. 715–
16). Such synopses will be very helpful to law stu-
dents and laypersons interested in learning about
a particular case, but it is an open question whether
they will hold much interest for ICL experts.
It is also worth noting that the synopses, like
the encyclopedia entries, all too often ignore or
downplay problems with the decision in ques-
tion—particularly if it was issued by the ICTY or
ICTR. (The most critical synopsis in part C, and
rightfully so, is Nehal Bhuta’s entry for Dujail,
decided by the Iraqi High Tribunal.) There are, to
be sure, exceptions: the Aleksovski synopsis criti-
cizes the ICTY appeals chamber’s willingness to
increase the severity of a defendant’s sentence sua
sponte, and the Blasˇkic´ Subpoena Proceedings syn-
opsis argues that the appeals judgment was much
too deferential to state sovereignty. By and large,
however, ICTY and ICTR entries are heavily san-
itized. The Tadic´ synopsis, one of the longest
entries in part C, discusses the appeals chamber’s
customary analysis of the three forms of JCE in
detail, yet—like “Joint Criminal Enterprise” in
part B—fails to acknowledge the intense scholarly
criticism of that analysis, particularly concerning
JCE III.19 The Jelisic´ synopsis never mentions the
appeals chamber’s insistence that genocide can be
committed by a “lone genocidaire,” much less that
its position has been criticized by scholars—in-
cluding by Cassese himself in the “Genocide”
entry—and rejected by the drafters of the ICC’s
Elements of Crimes.20 The Furundzija synopsis
does not mention that the appeals chamber’s
admittedly progressive holding that rape includes
forcible oral sex is highly questionable, given that
many ICL scholars believe such an expansive def-
inition cannot be considered a general principle
of criminal law.21 And perhaps most dramatically,
the Nahimana synopsis simply ignores the appeals
chamber’s shameful reopening of the ICTR’s pro-
ceedings against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, which
was motivated solely by a desire to appease the
Rwandan government.22
There are also some other, less serious, prob-
lems with part C. Some entries lack precision.
Alsto¨tter ( Justice trial), for example, should have
mentioned that the Tribunal’s elimination of the
nexus requirement for crimes against humanity
18 The case is not alphabetized correctly, for some
reason. It should come before “Nuremberg Trials”
(p. 856).
19 Perhaps not surprisingly, the two entries were
written by the same author.
20 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 177.
21 See, e.g., ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 3, at
129–30.
22 See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Case Report: Baray-
agwiza v. Prosecutor (Decision, and Decision (Prosecu-
tor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)), 94 AJIL
563, 567–68 (2000).
2010] 159RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
This content downloaded from 
             195.195.176.5 on Fri, 21 Jun 2019 09:21:01 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
was dicta because prewar crimes against German
nationals were not charged in the Indictment, and
that both of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal
cases in which such crimes were charged—Flick
and von Weizsa¨cker (Ministries case)—reached the
opposite conclusion.23 Other entries are simply
mistaken: contrary to the assertion in the Tesch
(Zyklon B case) synopsis, for example, the Rome
Statute does not adopt the principle, embraced
by the decision, that “persons can be held crimi-
nally liable for knowingly providing the means
of commission of an international crime.” Ar-
ticle 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute requires the
assistance be given “[f ]or the purpose of facilitating
the commission” of a crime.
Finally, it is questionable whether ongoing
cases should be included in the book. Although
doing so increases the book’s comprehensiveness,
it also means that it was at least partially outdated
the minute it arrived in bookstores. The synopsis
for Lubanga Dyilo, for example, concludes by
pointing out that the “future of the proceedings
and the chance of holding a trial will depend on
the decision of the AC” (p. 799). As we now know,
the appeals chamber has issued its decision, and
the trial is already under way.
The Oxford Companion is far from perfect: it is
uncertain who its audience is; it does not take
defense issues seriously enough; and it presents an
overly sanitized version of ICL. It also has a num-
ber of minor formatting issues that detract from its
usability. Ultimately, though, those are minor
quibbles—by any standard, the book is a magis-
terial achievement. And there will no doubt be
future editions, most likely many of them: given
how rapidly ICL continues to develop, the need
for this book will only grow over time.
KEVIN JON HELLER
Melbourne Law School
Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Indepen-
dence. By Marc Weller. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xxviii, 321.
Index. $90, £40.
Escaping the Self-Determination Trap. By Marc
Weller. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2008. Pp. 224. $74, €50.
Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Inde-
pendence and Escaping the Self-Determination
Trap, along with a closely related, edited volume
(Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex
Power Sharing in Theory and Practice) that is not
formally reviewed here,1 address issues that are
among the most complex and perplexing interna-
tional legal and political conundrums to have
(re)surfaced since the end of the Cold War. The
author, Marc Weller, is reader of international law
and international relations at the University of
Cambridge and director of the Cambridge-Carn-
egie Project on the Settlement of Self-Determina-
tion Conflicts. For many years, he was director of
the European Centre for Minority Issues (based in
Flensberg, Germany). These volumes reflect his
depth of practical experience and theoretical
knowledge.
The more recent of the two books, Contested
Statehood, offers a detailed chronological account
of Kosovo’s path to its current uncertain status,2
focusing on the negotiations that attempted to
identify a solution acceptable to both Pristina and
Belgrade between 1991 and February 2008, when
Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence.
Though many of the documents on which the nar-
rative relies are available elsewhere,3 this volume
sets forth a useful and readable analysis of those
negotiations.
23 See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10, at 108 (1949).
1 SETTLING SELF-DETERMINATION DISPUTES:
COMPLEX POWER SHARING IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (Marc Weller & Barbara Metzger eds., 2008).
2 As of January 2010, Kosovo had been recognized as
independent by sixty-five states, including most of its
European neighbors, but not by Serbia, Spain, or several
major powers, including Brazil, China, India, Nigeria,
and Russia.
3 See THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1989–1999: FROM
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO RAMBOUIL-
LET AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES (Marc
Weller ed., 1999).
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